THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

able. But if the choice is between government or large corporation controls on
the one hand and an almost painful amount of individual contributions on the
other, prudence dictates the latter alternative. The government would follow a
more proper course of action if it encouraged such contributions by increasing
the percentage deduction allowed for individual charitable contributions.
HENRY G. MAuE*
*Assistant Professor of Law, St. Louis University.

International Law and Asylum as a Human Right. By Manuel R. Garcia-Mora.

Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1956. Pp. vii, 171. $4.50.
The author of this important study locates the problem of asylum in the
broad field of human rights. After noting the persecutions of recent years, especially by totalitarian governments with an underlying philosophy hostile to
ethnic, linguistic, religious or political minorities within their jurisdiction, he
writes:
It is for people thus persecuted that asylum appears as the only hope, especially
when the United Nations Charter does not give individuals the right to appeal directly
to the Security Council, the General Assembly or the International Court of Justice
if any of the rights mentioned in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are violated. In the absence of such a procedure, international law has no other choice but to
recognize a person's right to demand asylum in foreign territory when confronted with
revolutionary upheavals and tyrannical regimes. As long as the law of nations does not
provide for a centralized machinery to which the individual could resort directly for
the adequate protection of his rights and values, asylum as a human right is filling a
gap in the international legal order [p. 163].

There has been a great deal of juristic and other discussion concerning the
best way to realize the commitments of the United Nations to assure general
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The first method undertaken by the United Nations was to achieve a clear definition of these rights,
and this was partially accomplished in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, approved by the General Assembly in 1948. This instrument describes
itself as "a common standard of achievement of all people and all nations,"
rather than as a legally binding instrument. The United Nations has attempted
to develop the principles of the Declaration into "covenants" of human rights,
which would have the latter character, but has encountered great difficulties.
Not the least of these difficulties has been the attitude of the United States
government which, under the pressure of the Bricker Amendment movement,
declared in 1953 that it had no intention of seeking the ratification of such
coyenants.
Instead, the United States proposed a program of education, which it called
an "action program," including annual reports from members on their progress
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in protecting human rights, studies of particular human rights and an advisory
service on specific aspects of the problem, including seminars and scholarships.
The General Assembly in 1955 authorized the Secretary-General to proceed on
the last of these proposals, and in the Spring of 1956 the Human Rights Commission gave, with some hesitation and dissent, a measure of support to the
whole program. Such activities, it is hoped, may keep world public opinion alive
to the importance of respecting human rights and may induce national governments to improve their legislation and administration under the pressure of
local public opinion, and a better understanding of the techniques best adapted
for giving practical protection to human rights. For many years, UNESCO has
been engaged in an educational program in the field, and the annual publication
by the United Nations of a Human Rights Yearbook has a similar objective.
It has become clear that different methods may be necessary for protecting
different types of human rights. Instead of a single covenant, two have been
proposed, one on civil liberties and the other on economic and social rights. A
further differentiation in the advancement of rights of the latter type is to be
observed in the activities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations.
Thus the International Labor Organization specializes on labor rights, UNESCO
on educational rights, the Trusteeship Council and the Expanded Technical
Assistance Program on the rights of underdeveloped peoples and the High
Commissioner for Refugees and his predecessors the International Refugees
Organization and United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration on
the rights of displaced persons and victims of war. Special subcommissions under
the Human Rights Commission have studied the protection of minorities and
women.
The traditional approach of international law to the subject of individual
rights has been through defining the right of intervention or interposition by
national governments to protect their citizens abroad or to protect persons
accorded specific rights by general treaties to which the interposing state is a
party. The United Nations as a collective body has occasionally interposed
through resolutions of the Security Council or the General Assembly in grave
cases of discrimination or other denial of human rights contrary to the Charter
or other treaties. Such action has, however, usually been resisted by the state
criticized on the ground that it constitutes intervention in its domestic affairs,
contrary to Article 2, Paragraph 7, of the Charter.
Judicial procedure for nullifying adverse legislation or administrative action
has been the normal means for maintaining individual rights within national
states. Such procedures have been proposed at the international level by recognition of the obligation of national courts to apply the Charter, treaties and
covenants of human rights, even though in conflict with national legislation,
by provisions for appeal to an International Court of Human Rights at the instance of aggrieved individuals, or by invocation of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice by application of a state or by request of an agency
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of the United Nations for an advisory opinion. States, however, have generally
manifested great reluctance to subordinate their legal sovereignty to such procedures of a civil character.
The same is true of criminal procedures. The Nuremberg Charter defined
crimes against humanity as well as those against peace and the law of war. The
war crimes trials at Nuremberg, and elsewhere, applying these principles, found
many persons of the Axis countries guilty of violating human rights. The Genocide Convention, which defines a particular crime against humanity, was initiated by the United Nations General Assembly and has been widely ratified,
though not by the United States. However, the effort to create a general code
of crimes against international law and to establish an international criminal
court to enforce it, irrespective of national legislation, has lagged because of the
fear by some states that the international court might not observe adequate
standards of judicial procedure, and the fear by some that it might interfere
with their policies or the methods they deemed suitable for conducting them.
The effort has been further hindered by the reluctance of many states to subject
their nationals to the jurisdiction of a "foreign" court, and by the lack of agreement upon the scope and nature of the crimes which should be subject to the
jurisdiction of such an international criminal court.
The halting progress of all these efforts to assure greater respect for human
rights throughout the world, by definition, by education, by specialized cooperation, by national or international political interposition, or by civil or criminal
adjudication at the international level, has suggested to some students of the
subject that attention should be concentrated on particular practical remedies
which might initiate trends of wider scope. Among such remedies particular
attention has been directed to the right of petition to appropriate international
bodies by individuals and non-governmental agencies for the purpose of giving
information or initiating an international proceeding, to habeas corpus or
similar procedures to protect individuals from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, even by their own government, and to the right of asylum, which is the
subject of the present volume.
Of all these methods for obtaining a toe-hold upon the problem of human
rights in a world of states jealous of their sovereignties, the last seems to the
author of this volume the most feasible, although he quotes Judge Lauterpacht:
[F]rom the point of view of strict logic the provision of the right of asylum from persecution would seem unnecessary or even obnoxious, for if the Bill of Rights is adhered
to there ought to be no room for persecution [p. 146].1
However, general respect for human rights does not seem likely in any immediate future. Consequently, it is important to give an opportunity to actual or
potential victims of persecution to escape. Unsatisfactory as is this remedy, it
may be for a long time the best that international law can assure, and even this
remedy encounters serious difficulties.
1Quoting Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights 345 (1950).
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At the present time, the right of asylum for the individual does not exist in
international law. Ships in distress may have a right to temporary asylum in
ports, and in time of war, belligerent troops and warships may have a right of
asylum in neutral territory, provided they submit to internment for the duration of the war. But in general, asylum is a right of the state, not of the individual. This right of the state falls into two categories, territorial and extraterritorial asylum, the latter referring to the somewhat controversial right of a
state to give asylum to refugees in its embassies, consulates, and warships in
foreign territory. The present volume does not deal with this matter, which was
recently discussed at length by the International Court of justice in the case of
Haya de la Torre, a refugee Peruvian politician who was given asylum in the
Colombian Embassy at Lima. It confines its attention to territorial asylum, a
right of states acknowledged to flow from their sovereignty.
The author discusses with insight and voluminous citation, first the limitations which states have often placed upon their exercise of this right by accepting treaty obligations, and second, the extent to which they have, in special
circumstances, acknowledged an individual right of asylum.
Limitations upon the grant of asylum have flowed mainly from the theory
that states have a common interest in the administration of criminal justice,
and their consequent tendency to conclude extradition treaties denying asylum
to fugitives from foreign criminal justice within their territory. The author
examines the law of extradition in detail, indicating the change from a practice
which provided for the extradition of political offenders, but gave asylum to
common criminals, to the opposite practice of the present. Grotius and Hobbes
in the seventeenth century regarded revolution with disfavor, and considered
its fomenters-traitors to their own country-as the worst criminals who in the
common interest of political order should be extradited for punishment. The
British revolution of the seventeenth century, however, developed a more
tolerant attitude toward revolution in that country, and in the eighteenth
century international jurists like Vattel recognized the "right of revolution,"
and urged that asylum be given to political fugitives. In the nineteenth century
extradition treaties increasingly excepted "political offenses," and at the same
time insisted that extradition should be accorded for ordinary crimes only
when specified in an extradition treaty, and when the extraditing country was
assured that due process of law would be observed in the prosecution.
The author deals effectively with the intricate problem of defining "political
offenses," which often are accompanied by common crimes. He prefers the liberal tradition, generally accepted by Great Britain and the United States, permitting asylum to persons who commit murder or other felonies clearly in pursuit of a political objective. The author favors excluding from extradition the
"crimes against peace," defined in the Nuremberg Charter, "the purely political" character of which, he says, "can scarcely be disputed" (p. 92).
He would also regard desertion from national military forces and other politi-
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cally motivated military offenses, such as sabotage and espionage, as "political
offenses." While he would allow asylum to perspns guilty of the first of the
Nuremberg crimes, as did the Netherlands after World War I in giving asylum
to the Kaiser, he regards the other two Nuremberg crimes-crimes against the
law of war and crimes against humanity-as "common crimes" sufficiently
defined to be extraditable.
In the present writer's opinion, it would seem logical to regard all clearly
established crimes against the law of nations as extraditable. If there is a common interest in the administration of criminal justice in any cases, there would
seem to be in the case of such crimes. On this matter, the author's argument
seemed to the reviewer unconvincing, as does his argument denying asylum
to "subversives," who, he says, "aim, not at overthrowing one particular government, but all governments." "[S]ubversives, whether we call them anarchists,
terrorists, or communists, are," he says, "enemies of all government irrespective
of their character," because they stand "in notorious opposition to all political
systems contrary to their revolutionary ideology." Their situation is, he says,
"totally different from that of political offenders" (p. 88). While international
conventions have defined "terrorism" as a crime against international law, and
the Institute of International Law in 1892 excluded from the concept of political
crime "[cirimes directed to uproot the fundamental social institutions, irrespective of national divisions or of any given political Constitution or form of
Government" (p. 100), it would seem that the author's broad concept of "subversives" lends itself to abuse. Unless more clearly defined and accepted by
international law it might be grounds for denying the freedom of opinion, religion, and ideology, guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
and of denying asylum to many whose only offense is adherence to unpopular
beliefs.
It would appear that codification of offenses against the law of nations should
be developed to indicate those offenses with a political aspect which should be
excluded from the concept of "political offense" and made subject to extradition
to the country where the offense was committed, or to the jurisdiction of an
international criminal tribunal, if such were established. Since in general crimes
against the law of nations, like piracy, are, under international law, subject to
the jurisdiction of any state which has possession of the alleged criminal, it is
possible that in this case the Grotian dictum that the state should either punish
or extradite should be applicable. It seems probable, however, that due process
of law would be better assured if an international criminal tribunal bad jurisdiction of such offenses.
The difficulty in recognizing asylum as an individual right, correlative with
an obligation of states to grant it, flows from the tradition that only states are
subjects of international law and from the acknowledged right of states to control immigration into their territory. The author easily disposes of the first
objection, pointing out that it arises from a fiction which conflicts with the basic
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Charter concept of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The International
Court of Justice has recognized that states by treaty may give individuals subjective rights under international law. There has been an increasing tendency
among jurists to acknowledge that individuals are subjects of international law,
and that in many circumstances states in prosecuting them or in protecting
their rights act as agents of the international community.
The latter difficulty is more serious. Every state feels that it should control
the composition of its own population for cultural and social, as well as economic
reasons. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, though declaring that
"everyone has a right to leave any country, including his own" and giving
everyone a right to "return to his country," does not give a right to enter any
other country.2 Another article of the Declaration reads: "Everyone has the
right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution." ' Originally the words "to be granted" appeared instead of "to enjoy" but many of
the states were unwilling to undertake a general obligation to admit those seeking asylum. Individuals can therefore, according to the Declaration, "enjoy"
asylum only in states which are willing to admit them. The right to "seek asylum" is, therefore, a very limited right. Even this right may be invoked only
to escape "persecution" and "may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions
genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations."' 4 This, incidentally, would seem to
bar asylum for those guilty of "crimes against peace" since the United Nations
has endorsed the Nuremberg Charter. The Universal Declaration, therefore,
provides a rather attenuated claim to asylum for persons guilty of "political
offenses" of the type excluded from extradition treaties.
While admitting that it would be de legeferenda, the author urges states to
accept a definite legal obligation to give at least temporary asylum to such
refugees. He further points out that this obligation has been undertaken in a
number of treaties, especially among Latin American countries, and that the
actual granting of such asylum has become a common practice, especially
among the free countries of the world.
In this connection, attention is given to the grant of asylum to prisoners of
war who do not wish repatriation, a question discussed at length in the Korean
armistice negotiations in 1953. The author concludes that the 1949 Prisoners of
War Convention did not exclude such asylum, and could not be held to abrogate
the general right of the states to give asylum. Furthermore, its intention was to
confer human rights upon the individual prisoners, which certainly would not
be compatible with the idea of compelling unwilling prisoners to return to their
country of origin with the risk of imprisonment or execution on the ground that
2 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights Art. XII, § 2 (reproduced in Sohn, Cases
and Materials on World Law 541-47 [1950]).
Ibid., at Art. XIV, § 1.
4 Ibid., at Art. XIV, § 2.
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they were in fact deserters. In spite of this conclusion, the author believes that
it would be desirable to revise the 1949 Convention in order to make this point
clear.
The author's treatment of the important problem of territorial asylum is
comprehensive, detailed, and clear. He begins his study with a general discussion of the status of the individual in international law and of the sources of
that law, in connection with which he discusses the merits of "positivism" and
"naturalism," with preference for the latter. He considers the views of the
founders of international law on these general questions, as well as on the specific question of asylum. This discussion makes it clear that, while the nineteenth
century fell away from the classical doctrine that the individual is a subject of
international law, it accepted the right of political dissent and revolution and,
increasingly, political refugees were able to obtain asylum in many states. The
author makes a strong case for a positive recognition of asylum for such persons
as a human right, agreeing with Ambassador Philip C. Jessup that "Precedent
and humanity would suggest that every state should be under an obligation to
grant temporary refuge to persons fleeing from persecution" (p. 5). Although
numerous cases are cited, the book lacks a table of cases and the index is too
brief. The content is sufficiently valuable to justify the reference paraphernalia
usual in law books. The book is an important addition to the growing literature
on human rights.
QUINCY WTRIGHT*
* Professor Emeritus of International Law, University of Chicago.

